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Abstract
Frequent new product releases pose signiﬁcant challenges for ﬁrms as they manage
successive generations of product diﬀusion. We develop an analytical model to study
the eﬀect of diﬀerent purchase options by strategic consumers on a ﬁrm's proﬁt and the
ﬁrm's strategies for the timing and pricing of its successive generations of product diﬀu-
sion. We show that consumers' strategic behavior, although adversely aﬀecting the sales
of the ﬁrst-generation product, positively inﬂuences the sales of the second-generation
product through an initial seeding eﬀect. The inﬂuence of strategic consumers on
proﬁt and sales depends largely on the discount-to-price ratio of the ﬁrst generation
relative to the performance improvement in the second generation. When the rela-
tive discount is small, the seeding eﬀect on the second-generation product dominates.
When the relative discount is large, the cannibalization eﬀect on the ﬁrst-generation
product dominates. We further demonstrate that the optimal entry timings recom-
mended in the literature (i.e., now, maturity, or never) can occur under diﬀerent
market conditions. In general, higher performance improvement and lower salvage value
would support a higher optimal price, a larger discount, and a later introduction time.
In addition, the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from patient consumers when the performance im-
provement is relatively small, and it can induce the complete substitution of the later
generation for the earlier generation when the performance improvement is relatively
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large. Overall, our model provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the eﬀect
of consumer strategic behavior on product diﬀusion, and our results oﬀer important
insights about ﬁrms' multi-generation product diﬀusion strategies.
1 Introduction
Rapid technological development in the industry has signiﬁcantly sped up new product de-
velopment, so that the price of a given model declines over time and several generations of
the same product tend to coexist in the consumer marketplace. Anticipating the introduc-
tion of a new generation of technology in the near future, potential adopters of the earlier
technology might choose to wait, cannibalizing the sales of the old technologya decision
by customers termed inter-temporal substitution (Norton and Bass, 1987). For example,
Apple sold 14 million iPads in the fourth quarter of 2012, which was signiﬁcantly less than
analysts expected. Apple attributed the lower sales to the fact that customers were holding
back and waiting for the newer models (Newton, 2012). A recent Mizuho Securities sur-
vey found that consumers have been taking a wait-and-see approach to Apple Watch before
jumping in, partly because of the prospect of added innovations in next-gen watches (Seitz,
2015). In September 2015, Apple announced that opening weekend iPhone 6S and 6S Plus
sales were more than 13 million units. The sales looked particularly strong, and the long
queue outside Apple stores clearly showed that many consumers had been waiting too long
for the new product. These examples show that ﬁrms must fully anticipate forward-looking
consumers' reactions to a future newer generation and take into account the eﬀect of the
consumers' strategic behavior on product sales of both generations.
The introduction of a newer generation product generally results in diminishing adoption
of the ﬁrst-generation product. On the one hand, we see cannibalization of sales from
the newer generation (i.e., the substitution eﬀect). On the other hand, when the new-
generation product is available, some existing adopters upgrade from the ﬁrst to the second
generation (i.e., the switching eﬀect). For example, Apple provides trade-in service for its
old-generation iPhone models when the new-generation model is introduced. In addition,
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the price cut of the old-generation product has a market-expansion eﬀect. Some consumers
who have not been able to aﬀord the old-generation product now can purchase the product
at a lower price. In the social-technological system, consumers' adoption of multi-generation
products follows an interactive diﬀusion process, where market segmentation is collectively
determined by substitution and switching to the newer generation, continuous diﬀusion of
the earlier generation, and both generations' penetration into new markets. How consumers
make trade-oﬀs between the performance improvement and the price discount of the two
generations requires careful consideration.
Classical multi-generation product diﬀusion models, such as the Norton and Bass (1987)
model, posit that the new-generation product follows an S-shaped growth curve similar to
that of the earlier generation product. These models suggest an initial market development
period in which the sales rate at the beginning of the new product introduction is low, and
the market penetration rate gradually increases over time (see Figure 1). However, recent
real market data from the high-tech industry rarely agree with such a growth trend. For
example, Apple received more than two million pre-orders in just 24 hours after the ﬁrm
started its sale of the iPhone 5 (Apple, 2012). The iPhone 5 took just 60 minutes to sell out
of its launch-day stock, showing incredible demand from consumers at the time of the new
product release. The dramatic jump in sales at the new product introduction can also be
seen in the iPhone quarterly sales ﬁgure (see Figure 1). The jumpstart on the sales cannot be
explained by existing multi-generation diﬀusion models, which typically assume a slow rate
of market penetration in the initial stage of the product life cycle. The tendency to ignore
individual consumers' adoption behavior is a key limitation in the aggregate-level, classical
Bass-type of diﬀusion models (Chatterjee and Eliashberg, 1990).
In this paper, we develop an analytical model that reasonably explains the jump as a
market seeding eﬀect of consumers' strategic waiting. Because forward-looking, tech-savvy
consumers are capable of anticipating the new product introduction, the way they trade oﬀ
among various purchase options when deciding which product to buy and when to buy it
aﬀects the demand dynamics in multi-generation product diﬀusion. Having diﬀusion models
that take into account consumer heterogeneity and consumers' strategic decision making,
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Figure 1: Comparison between the Norton-Bass Model and the iPhone Sales Data
and that are based on how market segmentation can inﬂuence the diﬀusion process, is highly
desirable. We aim to ﬁll this gap in the literature.
Building on the seminal Bass product diﬀusion framework (Bass, 1969), we propose a
model that takes into account heterogeneous consumers' buy now or later strategic pur-
chase decisions, which collectively inﬂuence product diﬀusion dynamics across successive
generations of products. Using a direct microeconomic approach, our model provides a
decision-theoretic foundation that explains individual adoption decisions and corresponding
market segmentation. In contrast to most existing literature, which treats consumer demand
and the substitution between the two generations as exogenous (Norton and Bass, 1987; Wil-
son and Norton, 1989; Mahajan and Muller, 1996), we allow for demand dependencies by
endogenizing the substitution and switching eﬀects based on strategic consumers' preference
for diﬀerent purchasing options. By fully anticipating the response of strategic consumers,
we examine how the ﬁrm's pricing policy and introduction timing policy aﬀect consumers'
strategic behavior, which in turn aﬀects the sales trajectory and the ﬁrm's proﬁtability.
We ﬁnd that consumers' strategic behavior, although adversely aﬀecting the sales of
the ﬁrst-generation product, positively inﬂuences the sales of the second-generation prod-
uct through an initial seeding eﬀect. The inﬂuence of strategic consumers on proﬁt and
sales depends largely on the discount-to-price ratio of the ﬁrst generation relative to the
performance improvement in the second generation. When the relative discount is small, the
seeding eﬀect on the second-generation product dominates. When the relative discount
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is large, the cannibalization eﬀect on the ﬁrst-generation product dominates. We further
demonstrate that the various optimal entry timings recommended in the literature (now,
maturity, or never) can occur under diﬀerent market conditions. We also observe more
extreme introduction timing (either at the beginning or at the end of the ﬁrst-generation
product life cycle) when the ﬁrm ignores consumers' strategic behavior and when product
development and production costs are considered (see Online Appendix). In general, higher
performance improvement and lower salvage value would support a higher optimal price, a
larger discount, and a later introduction time. In addition, the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from patient
consumers when the performance improvement is relatively small, and it can induce the com-
plete substitution of the later generation for the earlier generation when the performance
improvement is relatively large. Overall, our results oﬀer important insights regarding the
ﬁrm's optimal timing and pricing policies in the presence of strategic consumers.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we review the relevant
literature. Section 3 describes our base model and strategic consumers' purchase options.
Section 4 derives the market segmentation and presents the resulting product diﬀusion dy-
namics of the two generations. Section 5 provides some important managerial insights based
on numerical optimization. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are presented in the
Appendix. The Online Appendix further provides several model extensions to examine the
eﬀects of a more general pricing rule, an uncertain release time for the second-generation
product, and the incorporation of product development and production costs on the con-
sumers' behavior and the ﬁrm's strategies.
2 Literature Review
In this section, we review the technological diﬀusion models and discuss some recent exten-
sions. We focus ﬁrst on theoretical model development and then on empirical studies.
The earliest and most inﬂuential diﬀusion model is proposed by Bass (1969). Consistent
with the studies of the adoption and diﬀusion of innovations in the social science literature
(Roger, 1983), the Bass model assumes that the adoption process is aﬀected by two sources of
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inﬂuence in the social system: the external source of information (e.g., mass advertising) and
the internal source (e.g., word-of-mouth communication). The model describes how adoption
probabilities and rates change over time as new products penetrate a ﬁxed population, based
on a hazard rate function (i.e., the conditional probability that an adoption will occur at
time t given that an adoption has not yet occurred). Sales growth predicted by the Bass
model follows a logistic curve (i.e., the S-shaped growth pattern), which gained substantial
empirical support from a variety of durable goods.
Subsequent extensions have built into the model greater realism regarding consumer
adoption behavior. For example, Kalish (1985) characterized the adoption of a new product
as consisting of two steps: awareness and adoption. Awareness is generated by advertising
and word of mouth and is the stage of being informed about the product. Conditional on
awareness, adoption occurs if the perceived value of the product exceeds its price in a hetero-
geneous population. Much of the marketing literature has incorporated other marketing mix
variables, such as price and advertising, into the model (Robinson and Lakhani, 1975; Dolan
and Jeuland, 1981; Kalish, 1983; Feichtinger, 1982). For a comprehensive review of diﬀusion
models, we refer readers to Mahajan et al. (1990) and Peres et al. (2010). In addition to a
demand-side, Bass-type of diﬀusion model, a few studies in the ﬁeld of operations manage-
ment add the supply-side constraints (Jain et al. 1991;Kurawarwala and Matsuo, 1996;Ho
et al., 2002). For example, Balakrishnan and Pathak (2014) considered the inﬂuence of pro-
duction capacity on service quality in the presence of a supply shortage. In the context of IT
services, Niculescu et al. (2012) assessed how prices, network eﬀects, consumer heterogeneity,
and associated awareness jointly govern the adoption paths. In contrast to our research, all
these papers consider the diﬀusion of a single product.
As the product life cycle becomes shorter, the simultaneous coexistence of multiple prod-
uct lines or of several generations of a single product category is a commonly observed
phenomenon in the high-tech industry. Norton and Bass (1987) proposed a multi-generation
diﬀusion model that focuses on the technological substitution and the diﬀusion patterns of
multiple generations simultaneously. Jiang and Jain (2012) provided a generalization of the
Norton and Bass (1987) model by separating the switching consumers from the leapfrogging
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consumers in the substitution process. Alternatively, Mahajan and Muller (1996) proposed
a model that allows for partial leapfrogging and partial cannibalization between the two
generations. It suggests that a ﬁrm should either introduce a new generation as soon as it
is available or delay its introduction to a much later date, termed as a now or maturity
strategy. Building on Kalish (1985), which considers the two-step (awareness and adoption)
product diﬀusion in one product generation, Wilson and Norton (1989) extended the model
to a two-generation product setting, resulting in a now or never timing strategy. With
the focus on dynamic pricing, Padmanabhan and Bass (1993) suggested that the optimal
pricing strategy depends on the degree of substitutability across the two generations. Fur-
thermore, Krankel et al. (2006) and Ke et al. (2013) showed how operational decisions, such
as order policy and inventory cost, can aﬀect the optimal introduction timing decisions.
Mehra et al. (2014) studied successive software upgrade strategies in the presence of tech-
nological obsolescence. They showed that the optimal upgrade intervals are monotonically
increasing throughout the product's life cycle because of demand and cost considerations.
We complement these prior works by considering individual consumers' strategic behavior.
We demonstrate that both the now or never (Wilson and Norton, 1989) and the now or
maturity (Mahajan and Muller, 1996) introduction timing rules can arise as the optimal
strategy. We show that a wide range of timing choices could be optimal under diﬀerent
market conditions.
In addition to the continuous time models in the product diﬀusion literature, a few
studies have used two-period discrete-time models to analyze the sequential and simultaneous
introduction strategies of high- or low-end product line extensions. Moorthy and Png (1992)
suggested that, if a ﬁrm can commit to the subsequent prices and product design, the
introduction of a low-end product should be delayed to alleviate cannibalization of sales of
the high-end product. However, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) showed that the introduction of
a low-end product before its high-end variant might be optimal if technological improvement
is taken into account.
In terms of strategic consumers' decision making, Bala and Carr (2009) considered a
two-period model in which consumers anticipate product prices and qualities while the ﬁrm
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decides upgrade pricing. They showed that both product improvement and user costs play
a role in pricing software upgrades. Some recent studies in the operations management
literature also have incorporated intertemporal consumer purchasing decisions in anticipation
of a future price markdown (Aviv and Pazgal, 2008; Liu and van Ryzin, 2008; Su and Zhang,
2008). However, all of these works focus on inventory management rather than on multi-
generation product sales.
One key assumption of the Bass model is that the potential adopter population is ho-
mogenous, which implies that, at any point in the process, all individuals who have not yet
adopted a product have the same probability of adopting. To overcome this limitation, sev-
eral studies consider the heterogeneous consumer's choice processes in deriving the product
diﬀusion pattern. In the presence of competition between an existing mature product and
an uncertain new product, Oren and Schwartz (1988) developed a model in which risk-averse
consumers are Bayesian learners who use information generated by early adopters to update
their prior knowledge about the new product's performance. Hiebert (1974) and Jensen
(1982) studied the eﬀects of risk attitude and of learning, given uncertain perceptions of an
innovation, on the individual level adoption decision in a heterogeneous population. Roberts
and Urban (1988) used a dynamic brand choice model to study individual consumers' ac-
ceptance of a new brand when they are uncertain about the brand value. Chatterjee and
Eliashberg (1990) incorporated heterogeneity in the population with respect to initial uncer-
tain perceptions about product quality, risk attitude, price sensitivity, and responsiveness
to information about the innovation. Most of these models include Bayesian updating of
uncertain perceptions. Heterogeneity in these models is captured by diﬀerent initial percep-
tions. In contrast to this stream of literature, we assume heterogeneous consumer valuation
of the product and consumers' strategic behavior in the presence of several inter-temporal
purchase options.
In addition to the theoretical analysis already described, a substantial amount of empirical
research also has applied the multi-generation diﬀusion model to forecast growth in the
high-tech industry. For example, Danaher et al. (2001) studied both ﬁrst-time sales and
ongoing renewals of a subscription for two generations of analog cellular phone technology
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in a European country. They found that intergenerational interdependencies cannot be
ignored when extending single-generation estimates of price response over time to successive-
generation markets. Chu and Pan (2008) estimated the growth potential of the mobile
Internet market in Taiwan. Islam and Meade (1997) ﬁt the multi-generation model using
mobile phone technology data from eleven countries. Jun and Park (1999) and Kim et al.
(2005) adopted a consumer choice model to study the diﬀusion and substitution processes
of successive generations of the IBM mainframe system and the worldwide dynamic random
access memory (DRAM) market. Based on market survey data, Kim et al. (2001) proposed
an individual-level adoption model to incorporate both initial and repeat consumer purchases
in the multi-generation personal computer market.
Despite the eﬀort of incorporating micro-level decision making, Bass-type model varia-
tions cannot suﬃciently explain some actual market data. Song and Chintagunta (2003)
provided a structural model to explain the long time to take-oﬀ phenomenon observed by
Golder and Tellis (1997) and the saddle eﬀect in the sales pattern observed by Goldenberg
et al. (2002) in a single-generation product setting. They showed that forward-looking con-
sumers might strategically hold out on their purchase of a durable product, anticipating a
future price markdown. We complement this existing literature by considering strategic con-
sumers' behavior in a multi-generation product diﬀusion framework. The micro-modeling
approach provides a behavioral basis for explaining adoption at the individual level, which
leads to various patterns of diﬀusion at the aggregate market level. Our new model lays a
promising foundation for future empirical analysis.
3 Model Description
In this section, we focus on the key idea of our approach, which extends the classic, aggregate
Bass diﬀusion model (Bass, 1969) and its multi-generation version (Norton and Bass, 1987;
Mahajan and Muller, 1996) to a micro-level diﬀusion process that takes into account various
types of behaviors of strategic consumers.
We consider a durable technological innovation, such as a high-tech product like an
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iPhone. Let m be the population size and x(t) be the number of adopters by time t. Bass
(1969) has suggested that the conditional likelihood of adoption increases linearly in the
number of existing adopters that is, α + β x(t)
m
, where α and β are parameters called the
coeﬃcient of innovation and the coeﬃcient of imitation, respectively. The underlying ra-
tionale is that α captures external inﬂuences, such as the mass advertising eﬀect, and β
captures the internal inﬂuences, such as the word-of-mouth eﬀect, which depends linearly on
the market penetration in the product diﬀusion process. The adoption rate can be expressed
as a continuous time diﬀerential equation, x˙(t) = dx(t)
dt
= (α+ β x(t)
m
)(m− x(t)), which is the
probability of adoption multiplied by the number of potential adopters who have not yet
adopted the product. Throughout this paper, we use the dot notation to denote the ﬁrst
derivative.
Taking into account the price eﬀect, the deterministic market potential m can be ex-
pressed as a function of price. Kalish (1983) and Feichtinger (1982) have assumed x˙(t) =
(α+β x(t)
m
)(m(p)−x(t)), where m(p), the market size, is limited by the number of consumers
who are willing to purchase the product at price p, and m(p) − x(t) is interpreted as the
remaining market potential. We extend this line of literature by considering strategic con-
sumers. In the presence of strategic consumers, the conditional probability of adoption is
less than α + β x(t)
m
because some consumers prefer not to buy immediately after evaluating
their purchase options. Some consumers cannot aﬀord the product, and others choose to
strategically delay their purchase until the second-generation product release. Therefore,
only a segment of the penetrated market is converted to ﬁnal adoption based on the avail-
able options. We express the fraction of conversion as f(·) and call it the conversion rate.
The explicit form of f(·) is derived in Section 4.2. Accordingly, our model modiﬁes the con-
ditional probability of purchase by multiplying the awareness probability by the conversion
rate. The rate of adoption is expressed as x˙(t) = f(·)(α + β x(t)
m
)(m(p) − x(t)). Note that
the rate parameter f(·) was exogenously given in Kalish (1985) (parameter k in his model),
whereas in our model, f(·) is endogenously derived, based on the market segmentation of
aware consumers.
In the context of two generations of technological innovation, we assume the ﬁrst-generation
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product is available at t = 0. The introduction time of the second-generation product, τ > 0,
is common knowledge. The ﬁrm pre-announces its two-generation markdown-pricing policy
(p, δ) over [0, T ] as follows. The ﬁrst-generation product is priced at p. The second gen-
eration sells at the same price as the ﬁrst-generation product when it is released. At the
same time, the ﬁrst generation's selling price is discounted to p− δ. This pricing strategy is
frequently observed in the high-tech product market, as with Apple's iPhone product family.
For example, in late 2013, the newest 16G iPhone5S was sold at $199 the same price as
the iPhone5 before the iPhone5S was introduced. The 16G iPhone5C, which used the earlier
iPhone5 generation technology, was sold at a discounted price of $99 at that time. Use of
price commitments in connection with strategic consumers has been widely discussed in the
literature. The beneﬁt of a price commitment is that it encourages consumers not to gamble
on the future price movement, so they can make a purchase decision right away. Stokey
(1981) has suggested that a durable goods monopolist cannot charge a price above its cost
if the monopolist is unable to commit to future prices, in part because strategic consumers
delay their purchase in anticipation of the future price cut. Besanko and Winston (1990)
showed that ﬁrms can be better oﬀ when they commit to a declining price path.
The population is heterogeneous with respect to consumers' valuation of the product.
We assume that each consumer derives an instantaneous utility u per unit time for using
the ﬁrst-generation product and a higher instantaneous utility ρu, where ρ > 1 represents
the performance improvement, for the second-generation product because of enhanced func-
tionality, better quality, and so on. Because we focus on durable products, all consumers
consider the time period of the use of the product to be inﬁnite, with a discount rate r. If
a consumer buys the ﬁrst-generation product and uses it forever, the total utility generated
from using the product is u
´∞
0
e−rtdt = u
r
. We deﬁne the ﬁrst-generation product lifetime
value as v ≡ u
r
; similarly, the second-generation product lifetime value is ρv. For simplicity,
we assume v follows a uniform distribution over [0, 1].
The new generation of technology provides an opportunity for technological substitution
of the ﬁrst-generation product, which results in several types of strategic behavior. If a
strategic consumer prefers to wait for the second-generation product, she might forgo the
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opportunity to buy the ﬁrst-generation product, even though she would have adopted the
ﬁrst generation if the second generation were not available. We call this option the Leapfrog
option, which captures the intergenerational substitution eﬀect. If a strategic consumer
is only interested in buying the ﬁrst-generation product at a discounted price after the
second-generation product is introduced, then she is a laggard adopter of the ﬁrst-generation
product. We call this option the Laggard option.
If a strategic consumer prefers to buy the ﬁrst-generation product immediately, two cases
emerge: Some consumers might decide to buy the ﬁrst-generation product as a once and
for all decision. They enjoy the use of the ﬁrst-generation product and do not consider
adopting the second-generation product even after it becomes available. In contrast, other
ﬁrst-generation adopters might prefer to switch to the second-generation product when it
is launched. We call the former the Adopt option and the latter the Upgrade option. The
upgrade option is a widely observed industry practicefor example, note the Apple's iPhone
upgrade program in the United States. We call the consumers who decide not to buy either
generation of product the Non-Adopters. As a result, strategic consumers who are aware of
the ﬁrm's product at time t essentially have the following ﬁve options:
Adopt: Buy the ﬁrst-generation product immediately at price p and continue to use the
product for the product's lifetime; the expected total payoﬀ is v − p.
Leapfrog: Wait and buy the second-generation product with expected payoﬀ e−r(τ−t)(ρv−
p).
Laggard: Wait until the release of the second-generation product and buy the ﬁrst-
generation product at a discounted price; the expected payoﬀ is e−r(τ−t)(v − p+ δ).
Upgrade: Buy the ﬁrst-generation product immediately at price p and upgrade to the
second generation at time τ ; the expected payoﬀ is v − p+ e−r(τ−t)[(ρ− 1)v − p+ µ], where
µ is the salvage value of the ﬁrst-generation product. We assume that the salvage value
of a used ﬁrst-generation product is lower than the selling price of the new ﬁrst-generation
product at time τ ; that is, p− δ > µ, which implies no arbitrage.
Non-Adopt: Do not buy any of the products, with payoﬀ 0.
Note that the Upgrade consumers are the existing adopters of the ﬁrst-generation product
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who upgrade to the new generation, which captures the switching behavior among existing
consumers. In contrast, the Leapfrog consumers are the potential adopters who skip the
ﬁrst-generation product to adopt the second generation, which captures the substitution
behavior between the two generations. Although previous research recognizes the importance
of distinguishing the two types of behavior (Norton and Bass, 1987; Wilson and Norton,
1989; Mahajan and Muller, 1996), none has provided a sound behavioral basis to explain the
eﬀects. In the following section, we endogenously determine the market segmentation based
on consumers' evaluation of the diﬀerent purchase options.
4 Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze strategic consumers' purchase options and the resulting mar-
ket segmentation. We then examine the interdependent diﬀusion processes and characterize
the intergenerational diﬀusion dynamics of the two generations of products.
4.1 Market Segmentation
Regarding strategic consumers' wait-or-buy decision, the Adopt and Upgrade options corre-
spond to an immediate buy decision, and the Leapfrog and Laggard options correspond to
a wait decision. The Non-Adopt option is a no-buy decision. Strategic consumers consider
these options and choose the one that gives them the highest expected payoﬀ. Under certain
circumstances, some options can be dominated by others, and not all strategic actions can
be observed. The following Lemma pinpoints the circumstances.
Lemma 1. (Dominated Strategy)(a) If ρ− 1 ≤ p−µ, no strategic consumers choose the
Upgrade option.
(b) If ρ− 1 ≤ δ, no strategic consumers choose the Leapfrog option.
(c) If δ ≤ p(ρ−1)
ρ
, no strategic consumers choose the Laggard option.
Intuitively, only high-valuation consumers might have an incentive to upgrade because
of the relatively high increase in the valuation (ρ− 1)v available from the second-generation
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product. Notice that the eﬀective price that a consumer pays for an upgrade is (p − µ).
When (ρ − 1) is less than the price (p − µ), even the highest valuation consumer has no
incentive to upgrade because the beneﬁt cannot compensate for the cost. Therefore, in this
case, no strategic consumers choose the Upgrade option.
Note also that the tradeoﬀ between the Leapfrog and Laggard options is the increase in
valuation of the second-generation product and the price discount for the ﬁrst-generation
product. Lemma 1(b) indicates that if the value increase in the second-generation product is
small compared to the price discount of the ﬁrst-generation product, no consumers would be
interested in purchasing the second-generation product. In contrast, Lemma 1(c) shows that
if the price discount is too small, no consumers would be interested in the older generation
product if the newer generation product is available.
In reality, not all consumers who adopt the ﬁrst-generation product (v ≥ p) choose the
Upgrade option. In the following, we assume Upgrade occurs among some of the existing
adopters; that is, we assume that p < p−µ
ρ−1 < 1.
1 Under this assumption, together with the
no-arbitrage assumption p− δ > µ imposed in the model, we have δ < ρ− 1, which means,
by Lemma 1, that the value increase in the second-generation product is not too small and
that, as a result, the Leapfrog option is always attractive to some strategic consumers.
We deﬁne the indiﬀerence curves, lul(t), lal(t), and lag(t), where strategic consumers are
indiﬀerent between the Upgrade and Leapfrog options, between the Adopt and Leapfrog
options, and between the Adopt and Laggard options, respectively. These curves are deter-
mined by equalizing payoﬀs with the respective options: v − p = e−r(τ−t)(v − µ), v − p =
e−r(τ−t)(ρv − p), and v − p = e−r(τ−t)(v − p+ δ); they can be derived as:
lul(t) =
p−µe−r(τ−t))
1−e−r(τ−t)
lal(t) =
p−pe−r(τ−t)
1−ρe−r(τ−t)
lag(t) =
p−(p−δ)e−r(τ−t)
1−e−r(τ−t)
(1)
The following proposition presents the strategic consumers' decisions. The market segmen-
1If these assumptions cannot be satisﬁed, then some purchase options might be dominated by others, as
shown in Lemma 1. These scenarios can be easily analyzed because they are degenerated cases of the general
model presented in Figure 2.
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tation is illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 1. (Market Segmentation with Markdown Pricing Strategy)There
exist thresholds t1 = l
−1
ag (
δ
ρ−1), t2 = l
−1
al (
p−µ
ρ−1 ), and t3 = l
−1
ul (1), where lul(t), lal(t), and lag(t)
are deﬁned in Equation (1), and t1 < t2 < t3 < τ , such that
(a) When t ≤ max {0, t1}, consumers whose v ∈ [p − δ, lag(t)) choose Laggard; those
whose v ∈ [lag(t), p−µρ−1 ) choose Adopt; and those whose v ∈ [p−µρ−1 , 1] choose Upgrade;
(b) When max {0, t1} ≤ t < τ , consumers whose v ∈ [min{p − δ, δρ−1}, δρ−1 ] choose
Laggard; denote v∗ ≡ max{ δ
ρ−1 ,
p
ρ
}:
(b.1) When t < t2, consumers whose v ∈ [v∗, lal(t)) choose Leapfrog; those whose v ∈
[lal(t),
p−µ
ρ−1 ) choose Adopt; and those whose v ∈ [p−µρ−1 , 1] choose Upgrade;
(b.2) When t2 ≤ t < t3, consumers whose v ∈ [v∗, lul(t)) choose Leapfrog, and those
whose v ∈ [lul(t), 1] choose Upgrade;
(b.3) When t ≥ t3, consumers whose v ∈ [v∗, 1] choose Leapfrog.
Three possible scenarios emerge that depend on the discount-to-price ratio δ
p
, as shown in
Figure 2, in which the horizontal axis is the time dimension and the vertical axis represents
the valuation dimension.
When the discount-to-price ratio is smaller than the relative performance improvement
ratio (as in Figure 2a), the discounted ﬁrst-generation product is not attractive at all, and,
by Lemma 1, no strategic consumers choose the Laggard option. All sales after t > τ go to
the second generation. We call this case Complete Substitution because no consumers will
be interested in the ﬁrst-generation product after the second-generation product is released.
When the discount-to-price ratio is large enough, we have the general case (as in Figures
2b and 2c) where both generations of the product are sold and co-diﬀuse in the market.
The lower the discount-to-price ratio, the larger is the proportion of strategic consumers
who prefer the second-generation product. For a given discount-to-price ratio, as t increases,
more consumers choose to wait for the second-generation product. In addition, among the
early adopters, only high valuation consumers choose the Upgrade strategy. Proposition 1
has important implications for ﬁrms as they seek to adopt appropriate marketing strategies.
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Figure 2: Market Segmentation with Markdown Pricing Strategy
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It provides marketers with a better understanding of how the untapped consumers at dif-
ferent valuations evaluate their purchase options and how the composition of the segmented
potential consumer pool changes over time. This understanding is important for forecasting
the growth of sales.
After the release of the second-generation product, the proportion of buying consumers is
1− p
ρ
or 1−p+δ (see Figure 2). We see that both performance improvement and price discount
can be eﬀective means to attract purchasers. This insight is important for ﬁrms crafting
their market expansion strategy. In the presence of strategic consumers, if the discount-
to-price ratio is large enough, performance improvement changes the relative proportion of
consumers who purchase the second-generation product among the buying consumers, but
it does not contribute to the total market expansion. In contrast, if the discount-to-price
ratio is relatively small, then performance improvement is crucial for expansion beyond the
existing market.
Because the three indiﬀerence curves lul(t), lal(t), and lag(t) deﬁne the boundaries between
consumers who adopt the ﬁrst-generation product immediately and those who do not, the
following result shows how the proportion of consumers who are interested in the immediate
purchase of the ﬁrst-generation product changes when key market parameters change.
Corollary 1. (Wait-or-Buy)(a) The number of consumers who choose to adopt the ﬁrst-
generation product increases in the released time τ ; that is, ∂lul(t)
∂τ
< 0, ∂lal(t)
∂τ
< 0, and
∂lag(t)
∂τ
< 0;
(b) The number of consumers who choose to adopt the ﬁrst-generation product decreases
in the price p; that is, ∂lul(t)
∂p
> 0, ∂lal(t)
∂p
> 0, and ∂lag(t)
∂p
> 0;
(c) The number of consumers who choose to adopt the ﬁrst-generation product (weakly)
decreases in the price discount δ; that is, ∂lul(t)
∂δ
= 0, ∂lal(t)
∂δ
= 0, and ∂lag(t)
∂δ
> 0;
(d) The number of consumers who choose to adopt the ﬁrst-generation product (weakly)
decreases in the performance improvement in the second-generation product; that is, ∂lul(t)
∂ρ
=
0, ∂lal(t)
∂ρ
> 0, and ∂lag(t)
∂ρ
= 0;
(e) The number of consumers who choose to adopt the ﬁrst-generation product (weakly)
increases in the salvage value µ; that is, ∂lul(t)
∂µ
< 0, ∂lal(t)
∂µ
= 0, and ∂lag(t)
∂µ
= 0.
17
Other things being equal, Corollary 1(a) implies that, as the release time τ increases,
the indiﬀerence curves shift to the right and the areas of Upgrade and Adopt in the graphs
enlarge. Intuitively, consumers ﬁnd that waiting would forgo too much utility when the
release time of the second generation is far away.
In contrast, Corollary 1(b) suggests that, as the price increases, the indiﬀerence curves
shift to the left. In other words, compared to a lower price, a higher price makes the net
utility derived from using the product immediately smaller. The lower opportunity cost from
delaying induces more consumers to defer their purchase to a later time.
Corollary 1(c) implies that the price discount of the ﬁrst generation only negatively aﬀects
consumer choice between the Adopt and Laggard options. Intuitively, a higher discount
makes more consumers defer their purchase of the ﬁrst generation.
Corollary 1(d) indicates that the performance improvement in the second-generation
product has a (weakly) negative eﬀect on adoption because it induces strategic consumers
to wait for the better product. The performance of the second-generation product does not
aﬀect consumer choice between the Upgrade and Leapfrog options and between the Adopt
and Laggard options because the focal product being considered is the same.
Corollary 1(e) also shows that salvage value does not directly aﬀect the ﬁrst-generation
product sales at the beginning, but a higher salvage value increases the proportion of con-
sumers who upgrade. Therefore, it has a negative eﬀect on the ﬁrst-generation installed base
after the second generation is introduced.
In sum, we expect to see more strategic consumers adopt the ﬁrst-generation product
immediately when the second generation introduction time is later, when either the price
or the price discount is lower, when the performance improvement of the second-generation
product is relatively small, and when the salvage value is higher.
4.2 Diﬀusion Dynamics of Two Generations of Product
In the context of two generations of technological innovation, we use subscript i, where
i = 1, 2, to denote the ith generation. In the following, we explicitly derive the expression
of the conversion rate fi(·) and the market dynamics.
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4.2.1 Diﬀusion when t < τ
We denote the maximum market potential for the ﬁrst-generation product as m1. We inter-
pret m1 as the population that eventually would have adopted the ﬁrst generation had the
second generation not been introduced and had the ﬁrst generation been priced at 0. Con-
sumers who are aware of the product and who ﬁnd the price below their reservation utility
are the potential adopters. However, the actual adoption timing depends on the evaluation
of available purchase options. The diﬀusion process is as follows.
At any time, a certain portion of market penetration is achieved, and some consumers be-
come aware of the ﬁrm's product. These consumers make the purchase decision accordingly,
and they exit the potential market after doing so. Those who decide to buy immediately
become adopters of the product, and those who decide to delay their purchase and those
who decide not to buy are also excluded from the remaining potential market in the current
diﬀusion process. So the remaining potential market consists only of consumers who are
not yet aware of the product. A portion of this remaining market is reached in the next
time period, resulting in awareness of the product by some consumers and in their decision
making. Market penetration continues to occur until the release of the second-generation
product.
We assume any consumer is a strategic consumer with probability λ and non-strategic
(myopic) with probability 1−λ. A myopic consumer makes immediate purchase decisions as
long as her valuation of the product is greater than the product price. In contrast, strategic
consumers, who anticipate a future new product release and a price discount of the current
product, time their purchase to maximize their expected payoﬀs based on Proposition 1.
As shown in Figure 2, diﬀerent market segmentation yields diﬀerent rates of diﬀusion
at diﬀerent times, leading to diﬀerent market penetration patterns and diﬀusion dynamics.
Because of space limitations, we focus here on the most complicated scenario, presented in
Figure 2(c). Market dynamics under other scenarios can be derived in a similar way.
When t ∈ (0, t1], all Upgrade and Adopt strategic consumers buy the ﬁrst-generation
product. All myopic consumers whose product lifetime value is above the product price
(v ≥ p) buy the ﬁrst-generation product without considering the upgrade opportunity in the
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future. Therefore, the Upgrade conversion rate is λ(1 − p−µ
ρ−1 ), the Adopt conversion rate is
λ(p−µ
ρ−1 − lag(t)) + (1 − λ)(1 − p), the Leapfrog conversion rate is 0, the Laggard conversion
rate is λ(lag(t) − p + δ), and the Non-Adopt conversion rate is λ(p − δ) + (1 − λ)p. The
conversion rate calculation can be done similarly for t ∈ (t1, t2], t ∈ (t2, t3], and t ∈ (t3, τ ],
respectively.
We denote u1(t), a1(t), l1(t), g1(t), and n1(t) as the cumulative number of consumers who
have chosen the Upgrade, Adopt, Leapfrog, Laggard, and Non-Adopt options, respectively.
We can formulate the respective conversion rates as follows:
f (u1(t)) =

λ(1− p−µ
ρ−1 ) if t ≤ t2
λ(1− lul(t)) if t2 < t ≤ t3
0 if t2 < t < τ
(2)
f (a1(t)) =

λ(p−µ
ρ−1 − lag(t)) + (1− λ)(1− p) if t ≤ t1
λ(p−µ
ρ−1 − lal(t)) + (1− λ)(1− p) if t1 < t ≤ t2
(1− λ)(1− p) if t2 < t ≤ τ
(3)
f (l1(t)) =

0 if t ≤ t1
λ(lal(t)− δρ−1) if t1 < t ≤ t2
λ(lul(t)− δρ−1) if t2 < t ≤ t3
λ(1− δ
ρ−1) if t3 < t < τ
(4)
f (g1(t)) =
 λ(lag(t)− p+ δ) if t ≤ t1λ( δ
ρ−1 − p+ δ) if t1 < t ≤ τ
(5)
and
f (n1(t)) = λ(p− δ) + (1− λ)p. (6)
Assuming that the initial adoption of the ﬁrst-generation product is 0, we can express
the diﬀusion dynamics for the ﬁrst-generation product as:
z˙1(t) = f [z1(t)] (α1 + β1
x1(t)
m1
)[m1 − l1(t)− g1(t)− n1(t)− x1(t)], (7)
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where z1(t) = u1(t), a1(t), l1(t), g1(t), and n1(t), and x1(t) = a1(t) + u1(t) is the cumulative
number of adopters at time t. The term in the square bracket is the remaining market
potential at time t; that is, delayed adopters (i.e., l1(t) and g1(t)) and those who decide
not to buy (i.e., n1(t)) are excluded from the price-dependent potential market. Together
with the expressions in (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), the system of diﬀerential equations fully
speciﬁes the system dynamics when t < τ . Note that a key diﬀerence between our speci-
ﬁcation and the previous multi-generation diﬀusion models is that our model endogenizes
the market segmentation by consumers' strategic choices, whereas the previous models' ﬂow
dynamics across the various generations follow exogenously speciﬁed fractions for growth
and substitution.
4.2.2 Diﬀusion when t ≥ τ
Because technological improvements help ﬁrms expand into new markets and lead to addi-
tional unique demand for the new-generation product, this new-generation product presum-
ably creates its own market appeal that could not have been achieved by the ﬁrst-generation
technology. Following Norton and Bass (1987), we denote the new market demand as m2,
which is the incremental market for the newer-generation product.2
Following the technological innovation literature, the word-of-mouth inﬂuence is aﬀected
by the installed base. The installed base is deﬁned as the number of products in use for each
generation. In the one-generation case, the cumulative sales is equal to the installed base.
In the multi-generation setting, the installed base might decrease as a result of replacement
by the newer-generation product, so the base might be less than the cumulative sales. At
t = τ , we expect to observe a discontinuous jump for both generations because of the
waiting consumersthe Upgrade consumers will switch from the ﬁrst-generation product to
the second generation, the Leapfrog consumers will buy the second-generation product, and
the Laggard consumers will buy the discounted ﬁrst-generation product immediately. Denote
u1(τ), l1(τ), and g1(τ) as the total number of Upgrade, Leapfrog, and Laggard consumers
2Other assumptions regarding the new market demand are also plausible. For example, Mahajan and
Muller (1996) representm2 as the incremental market expansion after the newer-generation product becomes
available, so that both generations of products continue to diﬀuse and compete in the expanded market.
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at time τ . We have initial value x1τ = x1(τ) + g1(τ)− u1(τ) and x2τ = l1(τ) + u1(τ) for the
two generations of products.
In the spirit of Norton and Bass (1987), we denote y2(t) and n2(t) as the cumulative
numbers of Adopters and Non-Adopters from the unique market of the second-generation
product, respectively; y˙2(t) and n˙2(t) are the corresponding adoption rates. Their initial
values are y2τ = 0 and n2τ = 0. When t > τ , the instantaneous adoption rates follow the
following system of diﬀusion dynamics:

x˙1(t) = (
δ
ρ−1 − p+ δ)(α1 + β1 x1(t)+x2(t)+y2(t)m1+m2 )(m1 − n1(t)− x1(t)− x2(t)) (a)
x˙2(t) = (1− δρ−1 )(α1 + β1 x1(t)+x2(t)+y2(t)m1+m2 )(m1 − n1(t)− x1(t)− x2(t)) (b)
n˙1(t) = (p− δ)(α1 + β1 x1(t)+x2(t)+y2(t)m1+m2 )(m1 − n1(t)− x1(t)− x2(t)) (c)
y˙2(t) = (1− pρ )(α2 + β2 x2(t)+y2(t)m1+m2 )(m2 − n2(t)− y2(t)) (d)
n˙2(t) =
p
ρ (α2 + β2
x2(t)+y2(t)
m1+m2
)(m2 − n2(t)− y2(t)) (e)
(8)
Note that the two products, the ﬁrst generation and second generation, compete for mar-
ket share because of the substitution eﬀect. (See the diﬀusion dynamics in 8(a), (b), and
(c).) Because the total number of adopters for both products is x1(t) + x2(t) + y2(t), the
fraction of adoption in the population for both generations is expressed as x1(t)+x2(t)+y2(t)
m1+m2
.
Moreover, the second-generation product has its own unique market potential. The instan-
taneous adoption rate from this unique market penetration is expressed in 8(d) and (e).
Because both x2(t) and y2(t) are related to the adoption of the second-generation product
among the total population m1 +m2, the fraction of adopters is
x2(t)+y2(t)
m1+m2
.3
The ﬁrm's total discounted proﬁt, denoted as the net present value of sales for the two
generations, is expressed as:
3Following Mahajan and Muller (1996), an alternative speciﬁcation is:
x˙1(t) = (
δ
ρ−1 − p+ δ)(α2 + β1x1(t)+β2x2(t)m1+m2 )(m1 +m2 − n2(t)− x1(t)− x2(t)) (a)
x˙2(t) = (1− δρ−1 )(α2 + β1x1(t)+β2x2(t)m1+m2 )(m1 +m2 − n2(t)− x1(t)− x2(t)) (b)
n˙2(t) = (p− δ)(α2 + β1x1(t)+β2x2(t)m1+m2 )(m1 +m2 − n2(t)− x1(t)− x2(t)) (c)
The diﬀerence between this alternative speciﬁcation and Model (8) is whether the expanded market is unique
to the second-generation product or is shared between the two generations. The coeﬃcients αi and βi, where
i = 1, 2, could be the same or diﬀerent, depending on the nature of the technological innovation. Our
numerical simulation shows that our major insights are robust across the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
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pi =
´ τ
0
e−rtpx˙1(t)dt+ e−rτ (p− δ) g1(τ) + e−rτp[l1(τ) + u1(τ)]
+
´ T
τ
e−rt(p− δ)x˙1(t)dt+
´ T
τ
e−rtp[x˙2(t) + y˙2(t)]dt]
(9)
The ﬁrst term in the proﬁt function is the proﬁt from sales of the ﬁrst-generation product
before the second generation is released. The next three terms are the proﬁt from selling
the discounted ﬁrst-generation product to Laggards, and the proﬁt from selling the second-
generation product to Leapfroggers and to Upgraders at time τ , respectively.4 The fourth
term is the proﬁt from continued sales of the ﬁrst-generation product after the second-
generation product is released until the end of the planning horizon. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal term
is the proﬁt from sales of the second-generation product in both the competing market and
the product's own unique market.
The ﬁrm's total discounted proﬁt depends on a few key parametersespecially the
pricing- and timing-related decisions (p, δ, τ). Because of the complicated sales dynamics
involved, the eﬀects of price and release time τ are non-linear. The price variables (p, δ) are
often strategic decisions to which the ﬁrm commits in advance, and they can be treated as
ﬁxed during the short product life cycle. The introduction timing variable (τ) is a tactical
decision that the ﬁrm can control. We next examine how the introduction timing and pric-
ing strategies aﬀect the ﬁrm's total discount proﬁts, and whether the presence of strategic
consumers might alter the the conventional now-or-never (Wilson and Norton, 1989) or
now or maturity introduction timing rules (Mahajan and Muller, 1996).
5 Numerical Optimization and Managerial Insights
In this section, we take an incremental approach to understanding the eﬀect of strategic
consumers' behavior on the ﬁrm's sales and proﬁt. First, under a given ﬁrm's pricing and
timing strategies, we compare the diﬀusion dynamics with and without consideration of
strategic consumers. Next, for a given price and discount schedule, we examine a ﬁrm's
optimal timing strategy. Finally, we determine the optimal entry timing and pricing strategy
4Note that although the selling price to Upgraders is (p− µ), we assume the ﬁrst-generation product has
salvage value µ to the ﬁrm. So the unit net proﬁt from the upgrade consumers is still p.
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simultaneously through numerical optimization.5
5.1 Impact of Strategic Consumer Behavior on Diﬀusion Dynamics
Given the ﬁrm's decision about price, discount, and release time (p, δ, τ), we ﬁrst illustrate
how product diﬀusion curves are aﬀected in the presence of strategic consumers. Although
the shapes of the sales diﬀusion curves are highly dependent on the parameter values, our
main purpose is to show how the curves shift as the proportion of strategic consumers in the
population increases.
The parameter values in Figure 3 are as follows. The pricing policy used is p = 0.25 and
δ = 0.04, with µ = 0.16. We assume T = 6, and the ﬁrm plans to introduce the second
generation at τ = 3. The discount rate is r = 0.1, and the performance improvement ratio
ρ = 1.1. Furthermore, α1 = α2 = 0.3, and β1 = β2 = 0.6. We set m1 = 100 and m2 = 20.
We take as the benchmark the case in which consumers are non-strategic (i.e., λ = 0). We
compare the benchmark with two scenarios: one in which a consumer is equally likely to be
either myopic or strategic (i.e., λ = 0.5) and one in which all consumers are strategic (i.e.,
λ = 1).
The left panel in Figure 3 compares the diﬀusion of total sales for both generations of
product under the three scenarios. The right panel breaks down the total sales into the
ﬁrst-generation sales and second-generation sales, respectively, under the three scenarios.
We look ﬁrst at the dotted curve, which represents the myopic benchmark. Because the case
involves no strategic waiting, the cumulative total sales curve is smooth and increasing. The
division of sales in the right panel shows that the second generation starts its own diﬀusion
process at τ = 3 from 0. The sales growth of the ﬁrst-generation product is signiﬁcantly
slowed after this point because of the cannibalization of sales from the second-generation
product. The substitution of sales from the ﬁrst-generation product and the unique market
expansion of the second-generation product contribute to the relatively large sales of the
5In the multi-generation product diﬀusion literature, analytical tractability is a known challenge. As
is widely recognized in the literature, the analysis of a multi-generation product diﬀusion process using a
micromodeling approach in general has no closed-form results because of its inherent complexity (Chatterjee
and Eliashberg, 1990). We therefore resort to numerical optimization to derive the optimal solutions.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Sales Diﬀusion Dynamics: Myopic vs. Strategic Consumers
second-generation product.
In contrast, the solid curve, which represents the general case where some of the con-
sumers are strategic and some are myopic, replicates the Apple sales pattern we observed
in Figure 1. At the beginning, the sales curve has a slower increasing rate compared to the
myopic case. As time goes by, more and more strategic consumers prefer to waiteither for
the better second-generation product (Leapfrog) or for the price cut for the ﬁrst-generation
product (Laggard). At time τ = 3, we observe a sales jump for both generations. (See the
two solid curves in the right panel.) The sales increase for the ﬁrst generation is 6.1: an addi-
tion of 8.6 Laggards and a deduction of 2.5 Upgraders. Because this jump represents the net
eﬀect of Laggards minus Upgraders, the change to the ﬁrst-generation product adopters (the
installed base) could be either upward or downward, depending on the relative magnitude
of these two segments of consumers. The sales increase for the second-generation product
is 11.8: 9.3 Leapfroggers and 2.5 Upgraders from the ﬁrst generation. This jump is always
upward. The ﬁnal sales for the ﬁrst and second generations are 50.7 and 35.9, respectively,
which is smaller and larger than the myopic case of 61.7 and 22.1. The total sales is 86.6,
which is greater than the myopic case of 83.8. Hence, the myopic model underestimates the
sales of the second-generation product.
The dashed curve represents another extreme case, in which all consumers are strategic.
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As the proportion of strategic consumers gets larger in the population, sales of the ﬁrst-
generation product is further slowed. We observe a ﬂat growth rate in the time interval
(1.7,3), where almost all consumers wait until the introduction of the second generation at
τ = 3; then we observe a large sales increase for both generations (the dashed curves in the
right panel). A higher proportion of strategic consumers leads to bigger jumps at the time
of the second generation's introduction. The ﬁnal second-generation sales hits 48, and the
total sales for both generations is 89; both of these ﬁgures are higher than in the other two
cases.
Conventional wisdom tells us that, everything else being equal, the ﬁrm's sales and proﬁts
decrease in the presence of strategic consumers because strategic consumers might prefer
to delay their purchase (Besanko and Winston, 1990; Levin et al., 2009; Liu and Zhang,
2013). In sharp contrast, our results show that the seller could be better oﬀ in the presence
of strategic consumers. The total discounted proﬁt for the all-strategic case (λ = 1) is
the highest; at 17.4, it is greater than the proﬁt for the partial strategic case (17.2 when
λ = 0.5) and the myopic case (16.9 when λ = 0). The superior performance can be explained
as follows: As the number of strategic consumers increases, the number of initial adopters of
the second-generation product increases. This initial seeding helps to generate stronger word-
of-mouth inﬂuence, which speeds up the market penetration of the second-generation product
and leads to faster product diﬀusion of the second generation. The seller beneﬁts from the
higher volume of second-generation product sales that can be reached at the end of the
planning horizon. Ultimately, the gain from the total sales increase of the second-generation
product outweighs the loss of the total sales decrease of the ﬁrst-generation product. Our
main insight is that the presence of strategic consumers does not necessarily hurt the seller,
largely because of the initial seeding eﬀect of the strategic consumers who choose to wait.
Our ﬁndings underscore the importance of considering the eﬀect of strategic consumers on
the multi-generation product diﬀusion process. In contrast with the current practice of
oﬀering free trial software for a limited amount of time (Jiang, 2010; Cheng and Liu, 2012;
Dou et al., 2012), our results suggest that an alternative promising strategy is to educate
strategic consumers. Although the two approaches have the same eﬀect of jump-starting
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the diﬀusion, our approach has the advantage of not compromising proﬁts because strategic
consumers eventually pay for the product they purchase.
That strategic consumers might hurt the seller under some circumstances is also entirely
possible because of the lower volume of sales for the ﬁrst generation and the delayed proﬁt
realization resulting from consumers' strategic waiting behavior. The inﬂuence of strategic
consumers on proﬁt and sales depends on, among other things, the discount-to-price ratio
of the ﬁrst generation relative to the performance improvement in the second generation.
When the relative discount is small, the seeding eﬀect on the second-generation product
dominates. When the relative discount is large, the cannibalization eﬀect on the ﬁrst-
generation product dominates. Overall, our model is ﬂexible enough to generate a wide
range of sales patterns. It recognizes the possibility of a sharp jumpstart of sales for the
second-generation product when the product is introduced. The jump is well explained
by strategic consumers' waiting and is supported by the recent empirical sales data in the
high-tech industry (e.g., iPhone sales data in Figure 1).
5.2 Optimal Product Release Time with Pre-Announced Prices
Normative guidelines in the literature suggest that a ﬁrm should either introduce a new
generation as soon as it is available or delay its introduction until the maturity stage (or
end) of the preceding generation (Mahajan and Muller, 1996; Wilson and Norton, 1989).
Although a too early or premature release of the second-generation product results in forgone
sales of and proﬁts from the ﬁrst-generation model, late release of the second generation
delays its own market expansion and proﬁt realization. Because the release time of the
second-generation product inﬂuences both the product's own diﬀusion and the diﬀusion of
its preceding generations resulting from consumer switching and substitution, ﬁrms need to
consider the eﬀects on demand of both generations simultaneously. In general, we observe
three proﬁt patterns when we vary the introduction time of the second-generation product,
as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows how the ﬁrm's proﬁt (left panel) and total sales of the two generations
of the product (middle and right panels) change as the introduction time varies from the
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of Entry Timing on Total Proﬁt and Sales
beginning (a strategy of simultaneous introduction of the two generations) to the end of the
planning horizon (a strategy of sequential introduction of two generations of the product).
The solid curves are based on the benchmark values p = 0.25, δ = 0.05, and µ = 0.16,
assuming that all consumers are strategic (λ = 1). The dashed and dotted curves contrast
the scenarios when the product price p is higher and when the second-generation product
has a larger performance improvement ratio ρ.
Several interesting observations are worth highlighting. First, note that the sales dy-
namics presented in Figure 3 are associated with Node 1 on the solid black curve in Figure
4, with the corresponding introduction time at τ = 3. We see that introducing the second
generation at τ = 3 is not optimal. In fact, the seller can make a higher proﬁt by adopting
a simultaneous introduction strategy (Node 2 at τ = 0), earning a higher proﬁt of 17.96.
Simultaneous release of both products is similar to a versioning strategy in which the ﬁrm
oﬀers high-valuation consumers a high-quality product at a higher price and low-valuation
consumers a low-quality product at a lower price.
In fact, the seller can further increase its proﬁt by reducing the price p from 0.25 to 0.23.
As shown by Node 3 on the dashed curves, the highest proﬁt of 18.14 is obtained at τ = 4.4;
the ﬁnal sales for the ﬁrst generation is 52.6 and for the second generation is 38.9. Compared
with Node 2, reducing the price has two eﬀects. First, the lower selling price results in a
relatively higher conversion rate, which helps develop the ﬁrst-generation market in an initial
stage of the planning horizon. Second, a late introduction time for the second-generation
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product discourages strategic consumers' waiting, making high valuation consumers less
willing to postpone their purchase. Both eﬀects contribute to the ﬁrst-generation product
sales and the seller's early proﬁt realization, resulting in a higher total discounted proﬁt. The
solid and dashed proﬁt curves demonstrate the now and maturity optimal introduction
timing strategies identiﬁed in the literature (Mahajan and Muller, 1996).
A third type of proﬁt curve is shown as the dotted curves in Figure 4. In this case, the
optimal introduction time (Node 4) is at the end of the planning horizon τ = 5.9, which
represents the never optimal introduction timing strategy (Wilson and Norton, 1989). The
curve is obtained when we increase the quality improvement ratio ρ from 1.1 to 1.2. This
improvement implies that the second generation is a much better product. Higher valuations
from consumers make the second-generation product more attractive and therefore generate
a higher risk of sales cannibalization of the ﬁrst-generation product. The ﬁrm thus postpones
the introduction time as late as possible, so that more consumers would prefer to adopt the
ﬁrst-generation product at the beginning and upgrade to the newer generation when it is
available. Ultimately, our model supports various introduction timing strategies discussed in
the literature. Because consumers are strategic in nature, overlooking consumers' strategic
behavior would lead to non-optimal timing and inaccurate predictions of the ﬁrm's sales and
proﬁts.
Next, we compare the eﬀect of strategic consumers on the ﬁrm's optimal introduc-
tion time under diﬀerent price and discount policies. Under the base scenario, we fo-
cus on four price values p = {0.22, 0.23, 0.24, 0.25} and choose three price discount levels
δ = {0.02, 0.03, 0.05}.6 The left panel in Figure 5 contrasts the diﬀerent optimal introduc-
tion times under the diﬀerent price pairs (p, δ) for strategic consumers and non-strategic
consumers. We plot the corresponding proﬁts and total sales in the middle and right panels.
Comparing the upper left panel of Figure 5 with the lower left panel, we see that a wider
range of optimal timings is possible when strategic consumers are taken into consideration.
6Justiﬁcation of the parameter values is as follows: If p ≥ 0.26, then p−µρ−1 ≥ 1, and no strategic consumers
would choose to upgrade. The no-arbitrage condition p − δ ≤ µ requires that p > 0.21 for δ = 0.05.
These boundary values deﬁne the price range. In addition, if δ ≤ 0.02, no one would buy the discounted
ﬁrst-generation product. This condition imposes the lower bound on the discount.
29
  
(a) Non-Strategic Consumers
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
low
high
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
Sales
low
high
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
Profit
low
high
(b) Strategic Consumers
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
low
high
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
Profit
low
high
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
Sales
low
high
Figure 5: Optimal Timing Under Given Pricing Strategies
If we do not consider strategic consumers, the optimal timing is relatively stable against
price increases. When the discount is relatively small, the ﬁrm prefers to delay the intro-
duction of the second generation to avoid the cannibalization of sales. When the discount
is relatively large, the ﬁrm prefers to use a simultaneous introduction strategy. However, in
the presence of strategic consumers, the optimal introduction time of the second-generation
product becomes earlier as the product price increases. Moreover, the preference for an
earlier introduction time becomes stronger when the price discount for the ﬁrst-generation
product becomes larger.
In terms of proﬁt, the upper middle panel in Figure 5 shows that, without the considera-
tion of strategic consumers, the proﬁt always increases in price. Correspondingly, the upper
right panel shows that total sales decrease as the price increases. However, in the presence
of strategic consumers, the eﬀect of price on proﬁt and sales is not linear. For example,
when the discount is low, the proﬁt ﬁrst increases and then decreases as the price increases.
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The interdependence of the nonlinear price eﬀect and the introduction timing eﬀect must be
recognized. A relatively early release time not only cannibalizes the ﬁrst-generation product
sales, but also diminishes the strategic consumers' market seeding eﬀect, which negatively
aﬀects the second-generation product sales. Therefore, either insuﬃcient market seeding of
the second generation or the early discount of the ﬁrst generation can lead to lower overall
proﬁts. Comparing proﬁts with and without the consideration of strategic consumers, we
observe that ﬁrms tend to overestimate proﬁts when the selling price is relatively high and
to underestimate proﬁts when the selling price is relatively low.
Overall, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more likely to use a simultaneous introduction strategy
when they overlook the consumers' strategic purchasing behavior. This ﬁnding indicates
that ignorance of consumers' strategic behavior can lead ﬁrms to release products at the
wrong time, which often results in an overestimation of sales and either overestimation or
underestimation of the ﬁrm's proﬁtability.
5.3 Optimal Pricing and Timing Strategies
In the previous section, we investigated the introduction timing of the second-generation
product on the seller's proﬁt implications under given price and discount schedules. In
this section, we perform numerical optimization to jointly optimize the pricing and timing
decisions.
We start with the base scenario values and then vary the key performance improvement
parameter from ρ = 1.1, to 1.2 and 1.3, representing three scenarios of increasing performance
improvement of the second-generation product. The three scenarios are presented in Figure
6. Each scenario is examined using a series of numerical searches in the three-dimensional
parameter space (p, δ, τ). We thoroughly explore the price parameter space by varying the
values of p and δ in the allowable price range, using an increment of 0.01, and by varying
the introduction time of the second generation from 0 to T using an increment of 0.1. We
plot a series of curves to illustrate the diﬀerent cases in Figure 6. The left panels show the
general case, in which all ﬁve segments of strategic consumers exist, and the right panels
show the special case of complete substitution, in which no consumers buy the discounted
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ﬁrst-generation product after the second generation is released.
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Figure 6: Comparison of Optimal Proﬁt: General Case vs. Complete Substitution
Each dot in Figure 6 represents the highest proﬁt that can be obtained under a speciﬁc
(p, δ) conﬁguration, and each curve corresponds to a speciﬁc discount δ. Furthermore, each
curve is cut oﬀ by lower and upper bounded prices. No arbitrage condition requries p > µ+δ,
which gives the lower bound for each curve in the ﬁgure. In order to ensure Upgrade option
is attractive, we must have p−µ
ρ−1 < 1. In the base scenario, µ = 0.16. When ρ = 1.1,
1.2, and 1.3, respectively, p = 0.26, 0.36, and 0.46 deﬁne the upper bound of the price. If
the right-hand-side of the curve is cut oﬀ before it reaches the upper bound of the price
in the general case, the case degenerates to the special case of complete substitution (as
in Figure 2(a)). In the case of complete substitution, the price discount does not play a
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role, because no consumers would be interested in purchasing the discounted ﬁrst-generation
product after the second generation is released. For example, when ρ = 1.1 and δ = 0.02,
if 0.22 ≤ p < 0.26, then the scenario under the general case degenerates to the complete
substitution case. The proﬁt curve in this price range overlaps with the dashed line in the
upper right panel in Figure 6.
Comparing the general case in the three scenarios (the left panels in Figure 6), we see
that the seller can more feasibly charge a higher price and oﬀer a larger discount as the
performance improvement becomes larger. We see that, for a given discount on the ﬁrst-
generation product, the eﬀect of price on proﬁt is non-linear. The proﬁt curves can exhibit
many diﬀerent shapessuch as strictly decreasing; ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing; or
ﬁrst increasing, then decreasing, and then increasing again. In contrast, the eﬀect of the price
discount on the ﬁrm's proﬁt is monotonic. Holding the price constant, the ﬁrm's optimal
proﬁt decreases as the discount increases.
The optimal prices are found by identifying the dot that indicates the highest proﬁt in
each subﬁgure. Because older generation products often co-exist with the new-generation
product in consumer durables, the general case is more realistic and interesting than the
complete substitution case. However, we observe that the ﬁrm can earn higher proﬁt by
pricing strategically to induce complete substitution in some cases. In our example, although
the ﬁrm cannot yield a higher proﬁt than the general case when ρ = 1.1, it can achieve a
higher proﬁt by pricing at p = 0.22 and p = 0.31 when ρ = 1.2 and ρ = 1.3, respectively.
As long as the discount δ is no higher than 0.03 and 0.07, respectively, consumers are
not interested in buying the discounted ﬁrst-generation product after the second generation
becomes available, resulting in complete substitution of ﬁrst-generation product demand.
The result seems to suggest that a ﬁrm can induce complete substitution to maximize its
proﬁt when the performance improvement of the product is relatively large.
To see the eﬀect of other key model parameters on the ﬁrm's optimal pricing and timing
strategies, the following table summarizes a few interesting scenarios and presents the jointly
optimal decisions (p, δ, τ) and the resulting optimal total sales and total discounted proﬁts.
We focus on the more interesting general case.
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𝝆 Scenarios Parameter values 𝒑 𝜹 𝝉 Total Sales Total Profit 
1.1 Base 𝑇 = 6, 𝜇 = 0.16, 𝑟 = 0.1 0.19 0.02 4.3 93.45 21.04 
 Longer Horizon 𝑇 = 12 0.19 0.02 4.6 99.48 21.63 
 Lower Salvage 𝜇 = 0.1 0.18 0.01 3.9 115.48 17.46 
 Lower Discount 𝑟 = 0.05 0.19 0.01 4.9 92.26 25.80 
1.2 Base 𝑇 = 6, 𝜇 = 0.16, 𝑟 = 0.1 0.25 0.05 5.9 87.22 22.33 
 Longer Horizon 𝑇 = 12 0.25 0.05 6.1 95.69 23.36 
 Lower Salvage 𝜇 = 0.1 0.22 0.04 5.9 90.52 18.89 
 Lower Discount 𝑟 = 0.05 0.31 0.06 5.9 68.16 17.74 
1.3 Base 𝑇 = 6, 𝜇 = 0.16, 𝑟 = 0.1 0.31 0.08 5.9 80.53 22.20 
 Longer Horizon 𝑇 = 12 0.30 0.07 7.6 92.26 24.70 
 Lower Salvage 𝜇 = 0.1 0.25 0.06 5.9 87.13 20.09 
 Lower Discount 𝑟 = 0.05 NA NA NA NA NA 
 
Table 1: Optimal Pricing and Timing Strategies Under the General Case
In terms of the optimal selling strategies in the base scenario, we see that p = 0.19 and
δ = 0.02 yield the highest proﬁt of 21.04 when ρ = 1.1; that p = 0.25 and δ = 0.05 yield
the highest proﬁt of 22.33 when ρ = 1.2; and that p = 0.31 and δ = 0.08 yield the highest
proﬁt of 22.20 when ρ = 1.3. Having a very high level of performance improvement is not
necessary to make a higher proﬁt. Examining the optimal timing, we see that τ = 4.3
when ρ = 1.1, and τ = 5.9 when ρ = 1.2 and 1.3. These ﬁndings support the maturity
(Mahajan and Muller, 1996) or never (Wilson and Norton, 1989) optimal timing discussed
in the literature. Ultimately, Table 1 reveals three primary ﬁndings for the base scenario:
(1) Higher performance improvement in the second-generation product supports a higher
optimal price and discount; (2) The optimal introduction time tends to be late in the product
life cycle to mitigate the negative cannibalization eﬀect; and (3) Total proﬁt is not linearly
increasing in performance improvement.
If the majority of market penetration has been achieved across a short time horizon
(more than 80, compared with the potential market size of 120 in all base secnarios), then
extending the selling horizon has little eﬀect on the optimal prices and marginally delays the
optimal introduction time. An introduction timing strategy that aims for maturity might
emerge as the optimal one if the planning horizon is longer.
If the salvage value decreases from 0.16 to 0.1, we see that both the optimal price and
the discount tend to decrease in all three scenarios. The optimal introduction time is earlier
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when the performance improvement is relatively small (ρ = 1.1). In this case, even though
the total sales increase from 93.45 to 115.48, the total proﬁt decreases. The additional sales
seem unable to compensate for the loss that results from the lower proﬁt margin.
If the consumers have a lower discount rate on their utility, then the ﬁrm should avoid a
higher performance improvement. In fact, in the case of ρ = 1.3, no feasible price exists to
support the general case in which all ﬁve segments of strategic consumers exist. Intuitively,
when consumers are very patient (i.e., they have a low discount rate), they would prefer
to wait for the better second-generation product rather than adopting the ﬁrst-generation
product immediately. Hence, the Adopt option is dominated. When the performance im-
provement is relatively small (ρ = 1.1), the optimal prices are relatively insensitive to pa-
rameter changes. This relatively small range of best pricing options generally favors a later
introduction time (from 4.3 to 4.6) and yields a higher total discounted proﬁt. When the
performance improvement is relatively large (ρ = 1.2), the ﬁrm tends to charge a higher
retail price because of the better performance of the second-generation product. However,
the higher proﬁt margin hurts the sales of both generations of the product (total sales decline
from 87.22 to 68.16), leading to a lower total proﬁt. Thus, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ when the
performance improvement rate is relatively small and worse oﬀ when it is relatively large.
In summary, higher performance improvement and lower salvage value would generally
support a higher optimal price, a larger discount, and a later introduction time. If the
planning horizon is longer, the maturity introduction timing would emerge more often as
optimal. In addition, the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from patient consumers when the performance
improvement is relatively small, and it can induce complete substitution to maximize proﬁt
when the performance improvement is relatively large.
6 Conclusion
Rapid product innovation is common in many industries today. As the product life cycle
becomes increasingly shorter and new technologies are more frequently introduced into the
market, understanding how consumers strategically respond to such trends is becoming an
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urgent need. This paper studies the eﬀect of strategic consumers on a monopolistic ﬁrm's
multi-generation product diﬀusion strategies. We extend the original Norton and Bass (1987)
model, which captures diﬀusion and substitution at the aggregate level, to the consideration
of adoption decisions at the individual level, in which strategic choices by consumers deter-
mine the dynamics of the interdependent demand growth of two generations of a product. By
incorporating an enriched behavior model of consumers, our micromodeling approach better
captures the multi-generation product sales interactions and allows for market segmentation
in a way that has been impossible in traditional multi-generation product diﬀusion models.
Understanding the segmentation of the target population in terms of consumers' adoption
preferences enables ﬁrms to better predict their sales trajectory prior to a product launch. In
addition, better understanding the interrelationality of products and its underlying dynamics
can inform marketers for more accurate product forecasting and more eﬀective allocation of
marketing resources.
Our results underscore the importance of taking into account strategic consumers' pur-
chase behavior when managing successive generations of product diﬀusion. We provide
several major insights into optimal pricing and timing strategies that take into account the
demand dependency between the two generations of the product. First, we ﬁnd that the
seemingly undesirable delayed purchase from strategic consumers could actually be beneﬁcial
to a ﬁrm. The reason is that consumers who have waited for the second-generation product
are automatically converted to initial adopters of the new generation, which is essential to
boost word-of-mouth sales in the early stage of the new product diﬀusion process. Second,
we show that the inﬂuence of strategic consumers on proﬁt and sales depends largely on
the discount-to-price ratio of the ﬁrst generation relative to the performance improvement
in the second generation. When the relative discount is very small, the seeding eﬀect on
the second-generation product dominates. When the relative discount is large, the canni-
balization eﬀect on the ﬁrst-generation product dominates. When a ﬁrm does not consider
strategic consumers, it tends to overestimate (underestimate) proﬁt when the selling price is
relatively high (low), which causes the ﬁrm to introduce the second generation earlier than
it should. Third, we demonstrate that various optimal entry timings recommended in the
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literature (i.e., now, maturity, or never) can occur under diﬀerent market conditions.
Our model is ﬂexible enough to predict various sales patterns that can be ﬁtted with the em-
pirical data. Fourth, we show that higher performance improvement and lower salvage value
generally would support a higher optimal price, a larger discount, and a later introduction
time. If the planning horizon is longer, more maturity introduction timing would emerge
as optimal. In addition, the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from patient consumers when the performance
improvement is relatively small, and it can induce complete substitution to maximize proﬁt
when the performance improvement is relatively large. Finally, as seen in the Online Ap-
pendix, we ﬁnd that product development costs and production costs also aﬀect the optimal
pricing and timing strategy. When costs are considered, ﬁrms prefer extreme introduction
timing (either at the beginning or the end of the ﬁrst-generation product life cycle) in a
larger range of market conditions.
This study has a few limitations. First, we account only for the demand-side dynamics
without considering the supply-side capacity rationing. That is, the ﬁrm in our model does
not manipulate product availability to inﬂuence consumers' purchase decisions. Second, we
do not incorporate valuation uncertainty into our model. Third, we use a static markdown-
pricing strategy. Future work might relax the static pricing strategy and allow strategic
consumers to change their behavior by developing price expectations under dynamic pricing.
Future work also might examine the eﬀect of market competition on a ﬁrm's strategies in
managing its multi-generation product diﬀusion. In addition, empirical testing of the model
using data from high-tech ﬁrms is desirable. These extensions present interesting future
research opportunities.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (a) Strategic consumers who adopt the ﬁrst generation choose to upgrade if and only
if v − p + e−r(τ−t)[(ρ − 1)v − p + µ] ≥ v − p; that is, if v ≥ p−µ
ρ−1 . Because v ∈ [0, 1], no
consumers upgrade if ρ− 1 ≤ p− µ.
(b) Strategic consumers prefer Leapfrog to Laggard if and only if e−r(τ−t)(ρv − p) ≥
e−r(τ−t)(v− p+ δ); that is, if v ≥ δ
ρ−1 . Because v ∈ [0, 1], if δ ≥ ρ− 1, Leapfrog is dominated
by Laggard.
(c) Consumers may choose Leapfrog only if v ≥ p
ρ
and may choose Laggard only if v ≥
p− δ. Based on the proof in (b), the consumer with v = δ
ρ−1 is indiﬀerent between Leapfrog
and Laggard options. Therefore, the proportion of strategic consumers who prefer Laggard
to Leapfrog is in the interval
[
(p− δ),max{ δ
ρ−1 , p− δ}
]
. If δ
ρ−1 ≤ p − δ, or, equivalently, if
δ ≤ p(ρ−1)
ρ
, the interval is empty and no strategic consumers choose Laggard.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We deﬁne the indiﬀerent curve between Leapfrog and Laggard options as llg(t), which
is determined by e−r(τ−t)(ρv − p) = e−r(τ−t) [v − (p− δ)]. We thus have llg = δρ−1 , and
consumers with v > llg prefer Leapfrog than Laggard. Similarly, the indiﬀerent curve between
Upgrade and Adopt options lua =
p−µ
ρ−1 , and consumers with v ≥ p−µρ−1 prefer Upgrade than
Adopt.
We can verify that lag(t) is increasing in t, and thus t1 = l
−1
ap (
δ
ρ−1) < l
−1
ap (
p−µ
ρ−1 ) = t2 because
of the assumption δ
ρ−1 <
p−µ
ρ−1 . We can also verify that lal(t) is increasing in t. In addition,
the curves lua(t) and lal(t) interact at
p−µ
ρ−1 . Therefore, t2 = l
−1
ua (
p−µ
ρ−1 ) = l
−1
al (
p−µ
ρ−1 ) < l
−1
ul (1) = t3
because of the assumption that p−µ
ρ−1 < 1.
Notice that consumers might choose Leapfrog if v ≥ p
ρ
, and consumers might choose
Laggard if v ≥ p−δ. Consumers with v ≥ p prefer Adopt to Non-Adopt, and consumers with
v ≥ p−µ
ρ−1 prefer Upgrade to Adopt. Because min
{
p− δ, p
ρ
}
< p < p−µ
ρ−1 , among all consumers
who choose options other than Non-Adopt, low-value consumers only choose Leapfrog or
38
Laggard, rather than Adopt or Upgrade. Medium-value consumers might choose Adopt, and
high-value consumers might choose Upgrade.
We consider diﬀerent value segments as follows.
(1) For v ∈ [p−µ
ρ−1 , 1], Upgrade dominates Adopt because lua <
p−µ
ρ−1 , and Leapfrog domi-
nates Laggard because llg <
p−µ
ρ−1 . Therefore, the options that might appear to be optimal are
Upgrade and Leapfrog. By the deﬁnition of lul(t), when t < t2, consumers choose Upgrade
and when t > t3, consumers choose Leapfrog. When t2 < t < t3, consumers with v > lul(t)
choose Upgrade and the others choose Leapfrog.
(2) For v ∈ [0, p−µ
ρ−1 ], we distinguish two cases.
(2.1) If δ
ρ−1 ≤ pρ , Leapfrog dominates Laggard for all consumers who derive positive utility
from the Laggard option. Therefore, the options that might appear to be optimal are Adopt
and Leapfrog. By the deﬁnition of lal(t), when t < t2, consumers with v > lap(t) choose
Adopt, and the others choose Leapfrog. When t > t2, consumers choose Leapfrog.
(2.2) If δ
ρ−1 >
p
ρ
, which implies p
ρ
> p− δ, low-value consumers might choose the Laggard
option. (i) For v ∈ [p− δ, δ
ρ−1 ], the options that might appear to be optimal are Laggard and
Adopt. If lal(0) >
δ
ρ−1 , because of the monotonicity of lal(t), Adopt is dominated by Leapfrog
for all the consumers in this region, and Leapfrog is dominated by Laggard. Therefore, all
the consumers choose Laggard. If lal(0) <
δ
ρ−1 , noticing that lal(t) and lag(t) intersect at
δ
ρ−1 ,
we have t1 = l
−1
al (
δ
ρ−1) = l
−1
ag (
δ
ρ−1). Therefore, when t < t1, consumers with v > lag(t) choose
Adopt and the others choose Laggard. When t > t1, all the consumers choose Laggard.
(ii) For v ∈ [ δ
ρ−1 ,
p−µ
ρ−1 ], the options that might appear to be optimal are Adopt and
Leapfrog. By the deﬁnition of lal(t), when t ≤ max{0, t1}, consumers choose Adopt, and
when t > t2, consumers choose Leapfrog. When max{0, t1} < t < t2, consumers with
v > lal(t) choose Adopt, and the others choose Leapfrog.
Organizing consumers' choice along the time dimension, we conclude consumer segmen-
tation in the proposition.
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Online Appendix
A. Diﬀerent Prices for the Two Generations
In the baseline model, we assume that the price of the second generation is the same as the
original price of the ﬁrst generation p. Such a pricing strategy has been widely observed
in the consumer electronics industry (e.g., the prices for diﬀerent generations of iPhones).
In this extension, we consider a more general pricing strategy. We assume the price of the
second-generation product is higher than the original price of the ﬁrst generation, possibly
to reﬂect the performance improvement. The reverse case can be similarly analyzed.
We denote the price of the second generation as p+ h, where the price increment is such
that h ≥ 0. Similar to the baseline model, consumers have ﬁve options before the release of
the second generation. The main diﬀerence is now that the price of the second generation
is higher than the price considered in the baseline case. Consumers' payoﬀs under Adopt,
Laggard, and Non-Adopt remain the same as in the baseline case: v− p, e−r(τ−t)(v− p+ δ),
and 0, respectively. Under Leapfrog, consumers wait and buy the second-generation product,
and the expected payoﬀ becomes e−r(τ−t)(ρv − p − h). Under Upgrade, consumers buy the
ﬁrst generation and upgrade to the second generation later, and the expected payoﬀ becomes
v − p+ e−r(τ−t)[(ρ− 1)v − p− h+ µ].
We next illustrate the market segmentation by comparing it with the most complicated
scenario in the baseline model, presented in Figure 2(c). We can easily replicate all the
analyses for the other scenarios and show that all the results qualitatively remain. The
indiﬀerence curve between Upgrade and Adopt is determined by lua =
p+h−µ
ρ−1 >
p−µ
ρ−1 . Com-
pared to the baseline case, fewer consumers choose to upgrade because of the price increase
of the second generation.
Similarly, the indiﬀerence curve lul is deﬁned by v − p = e−r(τ−t)(v − µ), lal is deﬁned by
v − p = e−r(τ−t)(ρv − p− h), and lag is deﬁned by v − p = e−r(τ−t)(v − p + δ). In fact, only
lal shifts to the right. Compared to the baseline case, more consumers choose Adopt, rather
than Leapfrog, because of the price increase associated with the Leapfrog option.
Also, compared to the baseline case, the Laggard option becomes relatively more attrac-
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Figure 7: When Two Generations Have Diﬀerent Prices
tive than the Leapfrog option, and more consumers choose the Laggard option because of the
price increase associated with Leapfrog. The indiﬀerence curve now becomes llg =
δ+h
ρ−1 . The
consumers who are indiﬀerent between Laggard and Non-Adopt remain the same because
the price diﬀerence h has no eﬀect on either option.
Figure 7 illustrates the market segments under the general pricing strategy. The dashed
lines represent the shifts of indiﬀerence curves. Compared to the baseline case, the proportion
of consumers who choose the Upgrade and Leapfrog options shrinks, while the proportion of
consumers who choose the Adopt and Laggard options expands.
As we can see, the price diﬀerence h now plays a role in consumers' adoption choice and
thus also aﬀects the diﬀusion process. Using a similar computation, we ﬁnd that all the main
insights carry over to this extension, as long as the price increase is not dramatic. The overall
eﬀect on proﬁt is unclear. The price increase in the second-generation product reduces the
total number of adopters of the second generation, and it increases the number of adopters
of the ﬁrst generation because of the inter-generational substitution. Because the second-
generation product has its own unique market potential, compared with the baseline case,
the smaller number of Leapfroggers may have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the diﬀusion rate of the
second-generation product, resulting in more sales loss than can be compensated for by the
larger number of adopters of the ﬁrst-generation product. Therefore, the ﬁnal eﬀect on proﬁt
depends on whether the proﬁt gain from a higher unit price in second-generation product
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sales can compensate for the proﬁt loss from the cannibalization of second-generation sales
from the ﬁrst-generation product and the proﬁt loss from being unable to attract new sales
from the new market. Through our numerical simulation, we ﬁnd that charging a higher
second-generation price usually is unjustiﬁed. Although we are not able to analytically
characterize the conditions under which the general pricing strategy is optimal, we ﬁnd that
pricing the two products the same usually gives the ﬁrm either optimal or close-to-optimal
proﬁt. This insight supports the current practice of pricing the new generation of product
the same as the previous generation, while discounting the previous generation product price
to pick up the remaining market potential.
B. Uncertain Release Time
Now consider the uncertainty involved in the release time of the second-generation product.
For simplicity, we assume that with probability θ, the second-generation product will be
released at an earlier time τ − ε, and with probability 1 − θ, it will be launched at a later
time τ +ε. The probability of early release, θ, is determined by factors such as a ﬁrm's R&D
capabilities. We assume θ is ex ante unknown to consumers, and it is uniformly distributed on
the interval [0, 1]. Accordingly, the expected value of θ is Eθ = 1
2
. Without any information
shared between the ﬁrm and consumers, and among consumers themselves, consumers make
their wait-or-buy decisions based on their expectation of θ, and the expected release time is
1
2
(τ − ε) + 1
2
(τ + ε) = τ . This is the same expected release time as in the baseline case.
The eﬀect of uncertain release time on market segmentation is illustrated in Figure 8.
When the strategic consumers do not have any information about the release time, we have
the indiﬀerence curves indicated by the solid lines, which is the same as the base model. If
the actual release time is τ − ε (or τ + ε), and if the strategic consumers know the actual
release time, we have the indiﬀerence curves indicated by the dotted lines (or the dashed
lines). Note that only in the region where the release time is between the parallel bands
deﬁned by the dashed and the dotted lines do consumers make strategic errors because of
their lack of information. For example, consider the case that θ = 0; that is, the actual
release time is τ + ε. Consumers who become aware of the ﬁrst-generation product between
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Figure 8: Uncertain Release Time
the solid lines and the dashed lines (covered in the Leapfrog region) should buy immediately.
However, they choose Leapfrog in the absence of true information. In contrast, consumers
who become aware of the ﬁrst-generation product between the dotted lines and the solid
lines (covered in the Upgrade and Adopt regions) are not aﬀected.
In contrast to the price commitment, which is purely a strategic decision of the ﬁrm, the
release time of the newer-generation product is aﬀected by the uncertain R&D process and
the newer-generation production technology. Technically, the ﬁrm might not be able to fully
commit to the release time at the beginning of the planning horizon. In addition, although a
commitment to the release time allows the ﬁrm to coordinate strategic consumers' actions by
synchronizing the expected release time, whether commitment to the release time is beneﬁcial
is less clear because its proﬁt consequence is ambiguous. As a result, the ﬁrm might choose
to commit to its pricing strategy but keep the release time private. This strategy partly
reﬂects the current practices by ﬁrms in managing their new product and software releases.
C. Eﬀects of Product Development Cost and Production Cost on
Optimal Strategies
New product introduction requires investments in product development and production. In
this extension, we look at the eﬀect of product development cost and production cost on the
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ﬁrm's optimal pricing and timing strategies.
When the selling horizon starts, the development cost associated with the ﬁrst-generation
product is sunk. However, the ﬁrm incurs some development cost to develop its second-
generation product, which can be assumed as a convex function of the product quality
improvement ρ. We express the total development cost as k(ρ − 1)γ, where γ ≥ 1 and k is
the sensitivity parameter for quality improvement.7
To understand the eﬀect of production cost on the ﬁrm's strategies and proﬁtability, we
make several simpliﬁed assumptions. From an operational perspective, especially considering
the short product life cycle and the widely adopted practice of international outsourcing, we
assume the ﬁrm adopts a one-replenishment ordering policy, similar to Ke et al. (2013).
Under this policy, the ﬁrm places the ﬁrst order (or completes the production) of a certain
amount of the ﬁrst-generation products to satisfy all demand for the ﬁrst-generation products
at time 0. Then, right before the introduction of the second-generation product (i.e., at time
τ), the ﬁrm makes the second order (or completes the production) of a certain amount of
the second-generation products to satisfy all future demand for the second generation. We
let c1 be the production cost for the ﬁrst generation. We assume the cost of producing the
higher quality second-generation product is more expensive, and the unit production cost
is proportional to its quality improvement. For simplicity, let c2 = ρc1. To focus on the
insights related to the procurement (or production) cost, we ignore the inventory holding
cost because of the short product life cycle. We denote x1(T ) as the total sales of the ﬁrst-
generation product, and x2(T ) and y2(T ) as the total sales of the second-generation product
from the competing market and the unique market, respectively. The ﬁrm's discounted total
proﬁt expression can be modiﬁed as:
pip =
´ τ
0
e−rtpx˙1(t)dt+ e−rτ (p− δ) g1(τ) + e−rτp [l1(τ) + u1(τ)] +
´ T
τ
e−rt(p− δ)x˙1(t)dt
+
´ T
τ
e−rtp[x˙2(t) + y˙2(t)]dt− c1x1(T )− e−rτc2 [x2(T ) + y2(T )]− k(ρ− 1)γ
Building on the same parameter values as in the main text, we seek to understand how
the unit production cost parameters c1 and c2 and the quality sensitivity parameter k aﬀect
7We thank the AE and the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this modeling approach.
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the ﬁrm's optimal entry timing and pricing strategies and proﬁt. According to Luckerson
(2014), Apple's $649 iPhone 6 costs $200 to make. We assume c1 =0.05 and 0.08, which
account for 20%∼35% of the product selling prices in our numerical studies, to represent the
low unit production cost and the high unit production cost. For simplicity, let γ = 2. We
assume k =200 and 500 to assess the cost eﬀect of quality improvement, and ρ = 1.1 and
1.2, representing a small quality improvement and a large quality improvement.
𝛿 𝑝 
𝜏 (no cost) 𝜏 (with cost) 
𝜌 = 1.1 𝜌 = 1.2 𝜌 = 1.1 𝜌 = 1.2 
𝑐1 = 0.05 𝑐1 = 0.08 𝑐1 = 0.05 𝑐1 = 0.08 
𝑘 = 200 𝑘 = 500 𝑘 = 200 𝑘 = 500 𝑘 = 200 𝑘 = 500 
0.02 0.22 4.1 5.6 +0.2 +0.2 +0.4 +0.4 +0 +0 
 0.23 4.1 4.6 +0.2 +0.2 +0.3 +0.3 +0 +0 
 0.24 4 4.1 +0.1 +0.1 +0.2 +0.2 +0 +0 
 0.25 3.8 3.8 +0.1 +0.1 +0.2 +0.2 +0 +0 
0.05 0.22 4.6 5.3 +0.5 +0.6 +1 +0.9 +0.5 Never 
 0.23 4.4 5.5 +0.6 +0.6 +1 +1 +0.4 Never 
 0.24 3.8 5.7 Now Now Now Now Never Never 
 0.25 Now Never Now Now Now Now Never Never 
 
Table 2: Eﬀect of Quality Improvement and Cost Parameters on Optimal Timing Strategies
Table 2 shows the optimal introduction time of the second generation under diﬀerent
price-discount schedules (p, δ). The third and fourth columns present the benchmark case
without considering the development cost and production cost. We see that the optimal
introduction time decreases as the price increases. As the price discount becomes larger, the
rate at which the introduction time decreases in price is faster. Moreover, higher quality
improvement favors a later introduction time.
When the cost is considered, the eﬀect of cost parameters on the optimal introduction
time is diﬀerent. A higher unit production cost generally delays the introduction time, while
the eﬀect of the quality development sensitivity parameter is insigniﬁcant. When both the
price and discount are relatively high, a great quality improvement favors a Never strategy,
while a small quality improvement favors a Now strategy, as we see from the last two rows
of the table.
Table 3 shows the the revenue (without considering costs) and the net proﬁt (after taking
into account the product development and production costs) corresponding to the optimal
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𝛿 𝑝 
Revenue (no cost) Net Profit (with cost) 
𝜌 = 1.1 𝜌 = 1.2 𝜌 = 1.1 𝜌 = 1.2 
𝑐1 = 0.05 𝑐1 = 0.08 𝑐1 = 0.05 𝑐1 = 0.08 
𝑘 = 200 𝑘 = 500 𝑘 = 200 𝑘 = 500 𝑘 = 200 𝑘 = 500 
0.02 0.22 20.79 26.54 14.90 11.90 8.12 11.12 10.80 12.89 
 0.23 21.00 24.81 14.97 11.97 8.37 11.37 11.42 13.47 
 0.24 20.82 23.26 14.66 11.66 8.62 11.62 11.57 13.72 
 0.25 20.41 22.16 14.14 11.14 8.81 11.81 11.65 13.83 
0.05 0.22 18.66 22.01 12.78 9.78 8.00 11.03 11.16 12.99 
 0.23 18.14 22.19 12.18 9.18 8.17 11.17 11.1 12.96 
 0.24 17.53 22.29 11.93 8.93 7.54 10.54 11.09 12.94 
 0.25 17.96 22.33 12.51 9.51 7.52 10.52 11.07 12.91 
 
Table 3: Eﬀect of Quality Improvement and Cost Parameters on Revenue and Proﬁt
introduction times presented in Table 2. When the quality improvement is relatively small
(i.e., ρ = 1.1) and costs are not considered, the highest revenue is 21 under pricing strategies
p = 0.23, δ = 0.02, and the introduction time τ = 4.1. When costs are considered, the ﬁrm
delays the introduction time to τ = 4.3. The optimal pricing strategies remain the same
when the unit production cost is relatively low; when the unit production cost is relatively
high, the ﬁrm charges a higher price, p = 0.25, to try to protect its proﬁt margin.
When the quality improvement is relatively large (i.e., ρ = 1.2) and costs are not consid-
ered, the ﬁrm postpones the introduction time of the second generation to near the end of
the ﬁrst-generation life cycle (τ = 5.6 vs. 4.1) and charges a lower price (p = 0.22 vs. 0.23).
However, if costs are considered, the ﬁrm prefers to introduce the second generation earlier
(τ = 3.8) and charges a higher price (p = 0.25).
In summary, considering cost can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the ﬁrm's optimal pricing and intro-
duction timing. Although the optimal prices might be lower than they are when cost is not
considered, the optimal introduction timing tends to be more extreme; that is, more Now
or Never strategies can be found to be optimal.
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